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In Germany the performance of opening the electricity markets proves to 
be poor. While the sector’s productivity nearly doubled, the customers 
were left out in the cold. In actuality, the generat d redistribution mass 
remained in the firms. There, the management used th  threat of 
competition as an instrument for rationalisation and for the moderation of 
wage growth, while it simultaneously and successfully made an effort to 
circumvent the market competition. In the end, due to the established 
oligopolistic structures profits approximately quadrupled. 
However, at present there are indicators for a change in the market 
structures, brought about by a new political framework and the U-turn in 
Germany’s Energy Policies in the aftermath of Fukushima.  
This paper will analyse the market’s development based on the most 
recent data from Germany’s industry statistics. It also aims at explaining 
these findings and discussing the structural effects of the new 
environment. 
Keywords: energy policies, imperfect markets 
  
1.  THE PERFORMANCE OF GERMANY’S 
ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
In 1998, as part of the EU’s Common-Market programme, Germany 
opened its Electricity Markets. By doing so, German decision makers were 
convinced of the logic of liberalisation: electricity suppliers, which had formerly 
been operating as state controlled regional monopolies, were then confronted with 
competition for the first time. Taking this into account, they were expected to 
generate gains in productivity and enhance the redistribution mass on behalf of 
the customers. In the end, a reduction in electricity prices as well as a 
strengthening of the overall international competitiveness of Germany’s industry 
would result.  
For example, a price reduction of 20 up to 30 per cent was considered 
realistic by Germany’s former Minster of Economics (Rexrodt cited in 
Handelsblatt, 1998). However, as Bontrup and Marquardt (2011) pointed out, 
reality looks quite different. 
 
1.1.  Stylized Facts of the Liberalisation 
The following data are primarily based on the German industry statistics 
provided by the Federal Statistical Office. The data reflect the most recent status, 
which in most cases regards the year 2010, and they concentrate on companies 
with a key focus in adding value to electricity markets.  
 
Figure 1 Productivity in the Electricity Market 
Notes: 1) Net Value Added per Employee; 2) per Employee 





















Productivity 1) Net Value Added
Personell Expenditure 2) Employment
Regarding the productivity, the liberalisation was relatively successful 
(see Figure 1). Between 1998 and 2010 employment was reduced by about one 
fourth, i.e. by 58.000 persons in this sector. In the meantime the net value added 
increased by 77 per cent, leading to a more than doubled labour productivity. 
Although the remaining employees added more than twice as many values as 
before, this improvement was only passed on to them in parts. Personnel 
expenditures per employee merely rose by one fourth.  
In principal, the remaining redistribution mass could have been assigned 
internally to the shareholders or externally to thesuppliers of the electricity 
companies, the state or the customers. Indeed, externally especially the suppliers 
of coal and gas asked for significantly higher prices. Until the end of 2010 coal 
prices more than reduplicated while prices for non-liquid gas were five times 
higher than in 1998 (see Bontrup and Marquardt, 2012b, p.164). Moreover, the 
state continuously increased its dues. 
In reaction to this cost-side and administrative impulses, electricity 
companies demanded higher prices (see Figure 2). The prices paid by the German 
industry increased from 1998 until 2010 by approximately 30 per cent. From 
1998 until 2012 a growth rate of 50 % occurred. But, having filtered out the price 
components which were caused by the state, from 1998 until 2010 a decrease of 
about 5.5 per cent can be observed. With respect to the prices private households 
had to pay, the dynamics was quite similar, even thoug  a smaller reduction 
remained after adjusting for the administrative comp nents (see Bontrup and 
Marquardt 2012b, p.120). 
 














Final Price 1) Basic Price 2)
Notes: 1) excluding VAT; 2) including costs and profits of the suppliers, 
excluding all administrative components 
Source: BDEW, 2013 
However, regarding the described improvement in productivity, even the 
adjusted price development is completely disappointing, since it does not only 
reflect remaining cost-side stimuli passing through the prices, but also an 
aggressive price-setting by the electricity suppliers in order to raise their own 
profits (see Figure 3). Between 1998 and 2010 the net operating surplus of the 
electricity sector in Germany grew by approximately 400 per cent compared to 
50 % in the overall economy. Moreover these profits were scarcely transferred 
into investments but rather used for dividend payments as well as for mergers and 
acquisitions. Hence, against all odds, it was the shareholders who predominantly 
realised the gains of higher effectiveness and not the customers, as initially 
intended. 
 
Figure 3 Development of Net Operating Surplus 
Notes: The Net Operating Surplus was calculated as the difference of Gross 
Value Added – Depreciation – Personnel Expenditure. 
Source: Federal Statistical Office and author’s own calculations 
1.2 Causes of the Deficits 
The main reason why customers were deprived of the advantages of 
higher productivity was a market failure resulting from the firms’ strategy in 
combination with deficits in the market regulation (see Bontrup and Marquardt, 


























Electricity Sector Energy Sector Overall Economy
While on the one hand the management internally used competitive 
threats as an instrument for rationalization and moderation of the growth of 
wages, it on the other hand successfully aimed at circumventing the market 
competition. 
When Germany opened the electricity sector, the nine regional 
monopolies, which had been established before, soon tarted to merge. From 
2002 onwards, the so called “Big-4” (E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall) 
remained in the market as the big players. They dominated the process of 
electricity generation by temporarily owning about 90 per cent of the market’s 
capacity (see Bundesregierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2009, p.2). 
Furthermore, they controlled the grid and used this to exclude competitors from 
their own regional submarket by artificially high fees for the transmission of 
electricity. Additionally, they held capital participations in more than 300 
municipal electricity suppliers and thus had important influence on their own 
competitors` strategies. 
This development was permitted by deficits in regulations. To start with, 
the German competition law was too weak to prevent the process of mergers and 
acquisitions in the beginning. Secondly, exploiting the grid was made possible by 
a unique path German policy makers had chosen. Instead of a state controlled 
regulation, they opted for a non-effective, self-regulative form of the market’s 
participants. 
In the meantime, the framework has changed. Regarding the process of 
concentration in the preceding years, a limit had been reached. From then on, the 
antitrust agency has been operating restrictively when evaluating further mergers 
and acquisitions. Furthermore, in the light of an antitrust lawsuit E.ON did not 
only have to sell generation capacity, but also divested most of its acquisitions. 
With respect to the deficits in regulation German decision makers were put under 
pressure by the EU Commission. Germany was forced to implement a state 
controlled regulation authority operating with a “revenue-cap” for the grid 
operators (see Bontrup and Marquardt, 2010) as well as a legal unbundling of the 
value-added steps. This led to a massive decrease of transmission fees and to a 
partial selling of their grid by the “Big-4”.  
 
2.  ELEMENTS OF THE U-TURN IN GERMANY’S 
ELECTRICITY POLICIES 
In view of the breakdown of the nuclear reactors in Fukushima, the 
German policy makers reversed their stance on atomic power (see Bontrup and 
Marquardt, 2012a). Only seven months after the governm nt had agreed on the 
extension of the allowed operating time of nuclear plants, they decided to 
abandon the supply of electricity by atomic energy in predetermined steps 
completely. In 2022 all the nuclear power plants are bound to be deactivated. In 
addition, eight reactors were disconnected from the grid immediately.  
This policy, called “Energiewende” (i.e. “Energy Turnaround Concept”), 
requires strenuous efforts, especially in building up renewables as well as flexible 
gas and steam power plants. In detail, this policy concept will stipulate an 
accelerated extension of renewables up to at least 35 per cent of electricity 
production in 2020 and from then on 15 per cent points more every ten years until 
a level of 80 per cent will be reached in 2050. Furthermore, a more dynamic 
extension of the grid will be needed, especially in order to connect the on- and 
off-shore wind turbines, which are primarily located in the north of Germany, 
down to those regions in the central and southern part of Germany, where the 
industrial producers and the majority of the population are concentrated. 
The extension of the renewables is fostered by a system of subsidies in 
combination with a purchase commitment by the net operators (see Bontrup and 
Marquardt, 2012a, p. 29-35). The state has fixed a purchase price for each 
technology and for every kWh of electricity, usually guaranteed for the next 20 
years by law. The price has to be paid by the operators in advance. Furthermore, 
the operators are legally obligated to priorly buy “green electricity”. Afterwards 
the difference between the given purchase price and the current price at the 
electricity exchange is passed on to the customers via the consumers price of 
electricity. Hence in the end the customers bear the burden of the turnaround 
concept. 
In order to compensate for different investment risks and statuses of 
technological progress of the distinct generation technologies, the subsidies vary. 
They also vary in time, depending on the date of installation: the sooner the 
capacities are installed the higher the price will be. Depending on the expansion 
of renewable energies, the guarantee price can discretionally be changed for new 
investments.  
 
3.  FORMATION OF GERMAN WHOLESALE 
ELECTRICITY PRICES 
Customers normally buy their electricity at retailers. Nowadays, each 
household and each firm is able to, on average, choose between 85 suppliers. The 
degree of competition at this stage of energy supply is classified as satisfying by 
Germany’s Monopoly Commission (see Monopolkommission, 2011). Many 
retailers are municipal suppliers with none or at most limited generation 
capacities. They therefore have to buy most of the electricity at the wholesale 
markets either directly from the producers or indirectly via the energy exchange. 
The demanded price for their customers is calculated according to this purchase 
price. 
In the past, most of the electricity has been sold directly by means of 
long-term bilateral arrangements or by OTC-arrangements with intermediaries. 
Meanwhile, the energy exchange is gaining relevance. Du  to the new generation 
environment (compare below) retailers increasingly prefer the flexibility in 
purchasing at the exchange. They usually engage in future contracts, calculating 
the expected electricity demand at the date of the contracts’ maturity. Afterwards 
some fine-tuning can be done at the exchange via day-ahead purchases. 
Now, a new environment is consequential at this central stage of value 
adding from the Energy Turnaround Concept. It induces strong effects on the 
formation of wholesale prices and the oligopolistic market structure. 
In order to analyse this (see also Müsgens, 2004 and Ockenfels, Grimm 
and Zoettl 2008), let us for simplicity assume that at a certain point in time all the 
different arrangements which were due at this date could be aggregated to a 
common market where a uniform wholesale price establi hes. Maybe, this 
assumption seems strange, since there are three different market segments 
(bilateral or OTC arrangements, the spot market andfuture contracts at the 
exchange). However, all the segments of the market int ract and indeed will lead 
to a common market equilibrium which is dominated by the spot market price 
(see Bundeskartellamt 2011, p. 60). Due to the possibility of arbitrage even the 
particular form of execution arising from future contracts or bilateral 
arrangements depends on the exchange market spot price. For example, if the spot 
price at the electricity exchange is below the price agreed in the future contract or 
a bilateral agreement, the writer of the contract or he supplier will not have to 
produce the electricity physically by generating it in his own plant, but he will be 
able to buy it at the electricity exchange for a lower price. Hence, the generated 
supply of electricity all in all mainly depends on the spot market price. 
The demand for electricity in the wholesale market is closely inelastic. 
The demanding retailers are acting as agents of their customers and they have to 
satisfy the needs of their customers irrespective of the price. The demand of the 
customers itself is barely influenced by the fluctuating wholesale price, because 
the customers usually have to pay a predetermined fixed rate to their retailers. 
Hence, the demand in the wholesale market varies throug out the year and during 
the time of the day and thereby primarily depends on the needs. For example, in 
winter, when it is dark outside, people need electricity for switching the lights on 
or when people start to work in the morning the companies’ electricity demand 
increases. Consequently, the demand curve is almost vertical and its location 
depends on the varying needs of the customers (see Figure 4). According to 
Groscurth and Bode (2009, p.13) in peak times, i.e. in the evenings of November, 
customers demand a power output of about 80 GW per hou . In periods of low 
demand, i.e. in the early mornings of August, the demand drops to about 45 
GWh. On average, the demand amounts to about 65 GWh. Thus, the demand for 
electricity fluctuates in the shaded area (see Figure 4). 
With respect to the supply of electricity, the price has to cover the 
marginal costs, at least if we assume that there is no strategic shortening of 
generation capacities in order to push the price up artificially. Fixed costs are 
irrelevant in the short term as they have the characte  of sunk costs. They only 
influence investment decisions regarding future production capacities.  
 
 
Figure 4 Model of Wholesale Price Formation 
Source: Bundesnetzagentur and author’s own calculations 
Regarding the marginal costs, the most important items of expenditure 
are those for primary fuel and allowances in the EU mission Trading Scheme. 
Labour costs and general expenses could be neglected. A  given input prices 
marginal costs heavily depend on the generation technology (seeTable 1) and the 
maturity of a given technology, which determines it power efficiency. For 
instance, compared to gas power plants of the same age, modern coal power 
plants have an advantage regarding the costs of fuel, wh reas gas power plants 
are advantageous regarding the EU allowances. Due to the recent deterioration in 
the EU allowances, coal plants cause considerable low r marginal costs than gas 
plants. And compared to old coal plants, a new one p rates with higher 
effectiveness at lower emissions and hence at lower marginal costs. In practice, of 
course a more sophisticated calculation has to be done. For example, marginal 
costs need not necessarily have to be constant. In addition, we should take into 
account the fact, that the start-up and the shut-down f plants cause considerable 
costs. Thus, a supplier who normally is not able to store electric power, might 
temporarily even be willing to provide electricity at negative prices in order to 
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Table 1  
Estimation of Production Costs 
 
Notes: 1) Experience value or realistic value or technologically based value  
            2) Calculated values, 3) Recent market price 
Source: Following Groscurth and Bode (2009) and author’s calculations 
The described differences lead to a stepwise rising upply curve of 
electricity, called the “merit order curve” (see Figure 4). The curve exemplarily 
reflects the structure of generation capacities for the year 2012 in Germany. The 
curve only focuses on the supply provided on the wholesale market which 
normally does not include electricity generated by subsidised renewables and sold 
to the net operators in advance. Moreover, the curve accounts for the fact that not 
all the capacities being installed are available for production. While nuclear 
power plants are supposed to operate with full capaity, here for the other plants a 






Investment [Mio. EUR] 1) 1,500 750
Power [MW_el] 1) 1,000 1,000
Investment [Mio. €/MW_el] 2) 1.500 0.750
Interest Rate [WACC] 1) 8.00% 8.00%
Depreciation Period [Years] 1) 20 20
Annutiy [end of year; Mio. EUR] 2) 152.8 76.4
Equivalent of h/a in full use of capacity 1) 8,000 8,000
Production of Electricity [MWH_el/a] 1) 8,000,000 8,00 ,000
Costs of Capital [EUR/MWh] 2) 19.10 9.55
Power Efficency [Per Cent] 1) 46% 58%
Input of Primary Fuel [MWh/a] 2) 17,391,304 13,793,103
Equivalent of Input [Coal: t/a ; Gas TJ/a] 2) 2,136,524 49,615
Input Price per Unit [EUR/t ; €/TJ] 3) 106.97 8,391.00
Expenditure of Fuel [EUR/a] 2) 228,543,959 416,323,49
Costs of Fuel [EUR/MWh] 2) 28.57 52.04
CO2-Emissions [t/MWh Input Prim. Fuel] 1) 0.34 0.19
CO2-Emissions [t/a] 2) 5,913,043 2,620,690
CO2-Emission [t/MWh_el] 2) 0.739 0.328
CO2-Price of EUA [EUR/t] 3) 3.00 3.00
Costs of Emissions [EUR/MWh] 2) 2.22 0.98
Production Costs [EUR/MWh] 2) 49.88 62.57
Production Costs [Cent/kWh 2) 4.99 6.26
Marginal Costs [Cent/kWh] 2) 3.08 5.30
assuming empirically reasonable relations of the values for the different marginal 
costs on the one hand and, due to different maturities, a continuous rise of 
marginal costs within a certain technology on the other hand. It starts with those 
capacities that operate at the lowest marginal costs and so on. In this model, the 
supply of electricity generated by nuclear plants ha the lowest marginal costs per 
MWh. It is followed by lignite plants, then by hard coal and finally by gas power 
and oil plants. In practical, the different technologies are not that clearly isolated 
from one another in the merit order. For example, some new gas plants might 
have less marginal costs than old hard coal plants. 
In a scenario without subsidised renewables, i.e. with only the 
conventional plants producing electricity, the market price (pConv.) would vary 
according to the primarily need-related change in demand (see Figure 4). The 
price always allows for covering the marginal costs of the marginal provider 
(MPConv.). All the other producers that additionally serve th demand are gaining 
rents, which allow for covering their marginal costs as well as their fixed costs 
and perhaps for generating profits. 
However, the model is imperfect in two aspects. On the one hand the 
specific rule of the net operators has to be taken into account. In order to stabilise 
the voltage in the grid, the net operators coordinate the demand and supply side of 
the market while using the demand as the predetermin d market side. Hence, if a 
lack of capacity is to be expected, they will ask the producers to expand their 
supply. If a surplus of supply is looming, they will ask for a reduction of 
electricity generation. 
On the other hand the model has to be supplemented wi h the electricity 
supply by renewables. This “green electricity” is protected from the logic of the 
markets. Accordingly there will not be any cost orientation in supply-side 
decisions, since the purchase price is guaranteed and usually lies above the 
marginal cost as well as above the wholesale market price. In addition, the net 
operators have to priorly enable the unlimited feeding of the “green-electricity” 
into the net. This electricity is used to satisfy parts of the customers` demand in 
advance and is usually not sold via the wholesale market. Thus, only the 
unsatisfied customer demand remains in the wholesale m rket as a residual. 
Due to the generation of renewables, the residual demand curve shows a 
left shift (see Figure 4). But, the amount of eco-power that will be induced into 
the grid and the degree to which the (residual) demand curve will move to the left 
usually depends on the weather conditions. During hours of sunshine the 
photovoltaic modules are adding considerably to the supply of electricity, 
whereas in times of heavy wind the wind-parks do so a  well. Amongst all the 
subsidised residuals it is only hydro power utilisation, biogas, biomass and 
geothermal power plants that are able to provide electricity reliably. But, 
according to the data of the EEX these kinds of renewables only contribute to the 
generation power of renewables by only 14 per cent. Consequently, the 
conventional power plants are used as a stopgap primarily for the production of 
wind and solar energy in order to satisfy a highly fluctuating residual demand. 
Indeed, the volatility of the electricity generated by those two 
technologies is immense. According to the Data of the EEX from April 18, 2013 
a new record was set. The wind and the solar energy contributed 35.9 GW to the 
supply of electricity, i.e. at that point in time about 50 per cent of the demand was 
satisfied only by wind turbines and photovoltaic modules. On the contrary, for 
example on November 12, 2012 at 3 p.m. only 3.2 GW were provided by wind 
turbines and photovoltaic modules. On average in 2012 renewables in total 
generated approximately 15.4 GW per hour. 
With respect to the model, in a period of regular demand the price 
without electric power induced by wind and solar energy would be at pConv (see 
Figure 4). With all the subsidised power plants producing at their average 
capacity, it would be at pavg. Producing at the historically high capacity, it would 
even drop to plow. Hence, the renewables contribute to a price reduction at the 
wholesale market, which is called the “merit-order-effect” (see Sensfuß, 2011). 
This effect is dependent on the weather which determines the degree of capacity 
utilisation of the wind turbines and the photovoltaic modules. Due to several 
studies this effect is rising and it is estimated btween 5 and 10 EUR per MWh 
for the year 2011 (see Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie et al., 
2012). In comparison, the average market price at the EEX totalled about 50 EUR 
per MWh. 
Taking account of the supply provided by renewables, the price for 
suppliers of conventionally produced electricity is still determined by the 
marginal costs of the plant at the market’s margin. But the plant which is being at 
the margin (MPRen, max. or MPRen, avg.) is yet another one than in the case without 
renewables (MPConv.). Thus, the renewables tend to push conventional power 
plants out of the market. This trend increases, since the dynamics of the 
generation capacities of renewables in Germany is considerable. From 1998 to 
2012 the electricity provided by renewables increased with a yearly average 
growth rate of more than 13 per cent. During the same period the yearly average 
growth rate of the installed capacity amounts to 17 per cent. 
 
4.  INFLUENCE OF THE NEW ENVIRONMENT ON 
THE MARKET STRUCTURE 
The increasing importance of the renewables together with the other 
elements of Germany’s U-turn in Energy Policies will s gnificantly affect the 
market structure, which has already been changing sl ghtly before (see Chapter 
1). Especially the oligopolistic power of the Big-4 will gradually be undermined. 
Firstly, new producers of electricity have entered the market. While the 
Big-4 had concentrated on centralised nuclear, lignite, hard coal or gas and steam 
power plants, they neglected the segment of renewabl s for a long time. Owners 
of renewables, which apart from off-shore wind-parks are less capital-intensive 
than conventional plants, are typically farmers, private households, private 
investors and public utility companies. Meanwhile, the proportion of the 
renewables amounts to 43 per cent of Germany`s total generation capacity and 23 
per cent of the electricity production. Consequently, the market power of the Big-
4 is declining. Nowadays, according to the data repo t d by the 
Bundesnetzagentur they are holding only 60 per centof the generation capacity. 
Nevertheless, they are still powerful (see Bundeskartell mt, 2011), particularly in 
view of the fact that their contribution to the electricity supply is even more 
substantial, since their conventional generation capa ities operate reliably as they 
do not depend on any weather conditions. 
Secondly, the Energy Turnaround Concept causes a heavy burden 
especially on the profits of the Big-4 (see Figure 5) and particularly for the future 
success of their German electricity business. Apart from two minority 
participations they are the owners of the nuclear power plants. In the past, these 
plants worked as a profit-machinery, partly because some of them have already 
been depreciated and partly because some of the costs were external costs. For 
instance, as a result of an insurance gap the operating risk was socialized. 
Furthermore, as they operated with low marginal costs, they were positioned far 
ahead in the merit-order (see Figure 4) and could pro uce rents around the clock 
with the exception of times of maintenance work. Estimations are calculating that 
the Big-4 might set up claims for compensation in the otal amount of EUR 15 
billion due to the deactivation of their nuclear plants (see Handelsblatt, 2012a,b). 
However, whether they have a realistic chance to prevail in a lawsuit is highly 
controversial (see Bontrup and Marquardt, 2012b, p. 135-138). But there is 
another exposure to the policies’ U-turn that acts more indirectly. Due to the 
expanding and priorly feeding in of “green electrici y” into the grid, the 
conventional power plants, which are also concentrated in the hands of the Big-4, 
on the one hand earn less money, since the wholesale price declines via the merit-
order effect. On the other hand many power plants, especially those at the end of 
the merit-order have diminishing operating times. This does not only lead to 
higher costs of capital per MWh (see calculation in Table 1), but also to less 
situations in which the fixed costs could be covered by a difference between a 
higher market price and own marginal costs. Indeed, compared to the early years 
of the liberalization, the performance of the Big-4 was rather poor during the last 
two years and the outlook for their business in Germany is comparatively gloomy 
(see for example Handelsblatt, 2013). 
Thirdly, the Big-4 are facing unfamiliar problems in f nancing a strategic 
turnaround, which is urgently needed in view of the new market environment. In 
the past, instead of building reserves or making investments in fixed assets, the 
excessive profits were predominantly used for dividen s or mergers and 
acquisitions. In addition, due to their performance and their market power, they 
found favored conditions for borrowing at the capitl markets and thus 
accumulated debt over years. Now, confronted with the new situation in the 
market their ratings are downgraded. Thus, for them borrowing will be more 
expensive. However, financing the turnaround by cash flow is restricted by the 
more moderate profit situation. 
 
Figure 5 Profits of the Big-4 after Tax 
Notes: As the data apply to the consolidated accounts of the companies, they do 
not only reflect the described profit situation of the Big-4 in the German 
electricity market but in all business fields and worldwide. 
Source: Companies’ Financial Statements 
Fourthly, even if the problems in financing did not exist, the Big- 4 as 
well as all the other suppliers of conventionally produced electricity are 
confronted with an increasing uncertainty with respect to the calculation of future 
fixed investments. Hence, apart from expanding to the production of eco-
electricity, they do not have a reliable plan, how to expand their conventional 
power capacities. On the one hand, a more dynamic capacity building of gas and 
steam power plants will urgently be needed, since the expanding contribution of 
the unreliable wind and photovoltaic plants has to be combined with new flexible 
gas plants as backup capacities in case of unfavourble weather conditions. On 
the other hand, the impressive success of the extension of renewables perversely 
makes the investment into gas plants unattractive: Due to the higher contribution 
of renewables to the supply of electricity, the sector does not need as much EU 
allowances as before. The decline in the demand for the allowances reduces their 
price. In face of this, gas power plants lose attraction compared to coal power 
plants (see calculation in Table 1). And as a result of the merit-order effect, a 
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markedly reduced operating times for gas plants, which will typically stand at the 
end of the merit order. Hence, it can be assumed that these gas plants would have 
only few periods for covering the fixed costs, which on top of that would rise per 
output unit because of the reduced operating time (se  Table 1). 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
The story of Germany’s liberalisation of the electricity markets is 
characterised by the dominant role of the four oligopolistic suppliers. The 
German policy was partly unable to circumvent this development, partly the 
decision makers appeared to be too naive in believing in the self-regulation of the 
markets. Finally, the Big-4 used their market power for distributing the gains of 
the improved efficiency to their own shareholders. 
Due to the central elements of the Energy Turnaround Concept a gradual 
change is emerging. Although the Big-4 seem to discover the attractiveness of 
renewables, it looks like they have missed the ideal time at which a new strategy 
for their German business should have been created and implemented. As a result 
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